In this paper we develop methods for analyzing key management and authentication protocols using techniques developed for the solutions of equations in a term rewriting system. In particular, we describe a model of a class of protocols and possible attacks on those protocols as term rewriting systems, and we also describe a software tool based on a narrowing algorithm that can be used in the analysis of such protocols. We formally model a protocol and describe the results of using these techniques to analyze security properties. We show h o w a security a w w as found, and we also describe the veri cation of a corrected scheme using these techniques.
Introduction
It is di cult to be certain whether or not a cryptographic protocol satis es its requirements. In a number of cases subtle security a ws have been found in protocols some time after they were published. These aws were independent of the strengths or weakness of the cryptographic algorithms used. Examples include the Needham-Schroeder key distribution protocol 23 which w as found by Denning and Sacco 7 and Bauer, Berson and Feiertag 1 , to be vulnerable to various kinds of replay attacks that can be used whenever old keys are compromised, the software protection scheme of Purdy, Simmons, and Studier 25 , for which Simmons 28 showed how a penetrator could combine previously generated messages in such a w a y that the system could be induced to grant unauthorized access to software, and a protocol in the CCITT X.509 draft standard 5 , which w as shown by Burrows, Abadi, and Needham 4 to be vulnerable to replay attacks even when keys are not compromised. Other similarly awed protocols are discussed by Moore in 21 .
As more systems are designed that depend upon such protocols for more varied and complex security needs, it is likely that other aws will arise. If systematic means of assuring correctness are not used, these aws may not be discovered until signi cant damage has been done.
One approach to the problem of assuring correctness that has been suggested, for example by Kemmerer in 13 , is to use machine aided formal veri cation techniques. The protocol and its desirable security properties are modeled in a formal speci cation language, and a machine veri cation system is used in an attempt to prove that these properties hold. If the attempt succeeds, one has gained greater assurance that the protocol satis es its requirements. If it fails, then the examination of the reasons for the failure may point out security a ws in the protocol.
Techniques like these have been applied in the design of communication protocols and of secure computing systems. Thus it seems likely that they will be useful in the analysis of key management protocols, which h a v e some of the properties of both. Yet so far they have found little application. Part of the reason for this may be that existing machine veri cation systems do not emphasize the theorem-proving techniques that would be most useful in the analysis of such protocols. In this paper we attempt to ll In this case the second output reduces to J. This is used to check that the key transfer has taken place correctly, and to provide authentication of the message. The processor also decrypts the key and uses it to decrypt the message, that is, to compute ddqB,edk,X,dqB,dk,Y,M, which produces the decrypted message inside the processor. The processor then uses the decrypted message according to the rules of the application.
This protocol is relatively simple. We w ere able to specify it using only eleven protocol rules and three rewrite rules, thus making an analysis that proceeded largely by hand practical. However, the complexity of the operations used, which made it di cult for an analyst to gain an intuitive feeling for the security of the protocol, and its reliance on mechanisms similar to those employed by an earlier, awed, protocol 25 , suggested that a formal analysis was necessary. These facts made the protocol an excellent test case for our methods.
The Attack
Our analysis found a means by which a penetrator could induce a participant to believe that he was decrypting a message supplied by some other honest participant when he was actually decrypting a message supplied by the penetrator. By supplying incorrect information to his processor when it is run in encrypt message mode, a penetrator can encrypt his own message using another processor's key. This allows a penetrator to impersonate other members of the network. This aw can be corrected by relying on the processor, instead of the protocol participant, to supply the rst word input when it is run in encrypt message mode. We altered the speci cation to correct this aw, and used our techniques to prove that the altered speci cation satis ed the desired security property.
The attack on the original protocol works as follows. We assume that the penetrator has access to some module x. First, the penetrator purchases the right to program p with identi er j from some honest user a. User a sends ek,qa ek,eqx,dqa,eqx,dqa,dk,j edqa,dk,j,p to the penetrator. The rst word is a's encrypted identi er, the second is the encrypted key, and the third is the encrypted message. The penetrator submits the following words to his module in encrypt message mode: X = ek,qa Y = ek,eqx,dqa,eqx,dqa,dk,j Z = p x where px is a program supplied by the penetrator, and the second word supplied is the encrypted key supplied by a. The third word output by the module is edqx,edk,ek,qa,dqx,dk,ek,qx,dqa,eqx,dqa,dk,j,px which reduces to edqa,dk,j,px. Now suppose that user b requests program p with identi er j from user a. User a sends ek,qa ek,eqb,dqa,eqb,dqa,dk,j edqa,dk,j,p to b. The penetrator intercepts the message and replaces the third word by edqa,dk,j,px. He then sends the message to b. User b inserts the three words in his module in decrypt message mode. The module outputs the words ek,qb ek,edk,ek,qa,dqb,edk,ek,qa,dqb,eqb,dqa,eqb,dqa,dk,j which reduces to j. Thus the module believes that it has received the correct message, and produces the decrypted message ddqb,edk,ek,qa,dqb,dk,ek,eqb,dqa,eqb,dqa,dk,j,edqa,dk,j,px which reduces to px.
The Fix
In our analysis of the protocol, we w ere able to prove that a penetrator could successfully pass o his message px as user a's if and only if he was able to produce the word edqa,dk,j,px. Thus, in order to modify the protocol so that it would be secure, all that was necessary to do was to make it impossible for the penetrator to produce that word. We did this by requiring that the module itself supply the rst word input when it is run in encrypt message mode. This can be done since that word is just the encrypted identi er of the module. We then proved a general theorem which implied that any state that was unreachable in the old protocol was also unreachable in the new one. This meant that we did not have t o r e v erify old security results, which w ere de ned in terms of unreachability of states. Finally, w e showed that the word edqa,dk,j,px was unobtainable in the new version of the protocol.
In the remainder of this paper, we will show h o w w e modeled the protocol, and how w e discovered the aw and veri ed the security of the corrected protocol.
Description of the Model and Proof Techniques Used
The model we use is an adaptation of the public-key model developed by Dolev and Yao in 8 . We consider a protocol as a set of rules for passing messages between the participants. A participant in the protocol who receives a message will, if he accepts it as genuine, generate a new message by performing certain operations upon it or other messages received earlier. Thus a cryptographic protocol may b e thought of in part as a set of rules for generating words in some formal language. In symbolic terms, we can think of these operations as being applied in two steps: rst operations are applied to a word or set of words, and then algebraic properties of the operations are used such as the fact that encryption cancels out decryption with the same key and vice versa to produce the actual words generated. Since in many cases the algebraic properties of the operations involved can be interpreted as reduction rules that is, a set of rules for transforming words into words that are simpler" according to some well-de ned measure, the protocol may be thought of in part as a set of rules for generating words in a term-rewriting language. A penetrator who tries to break the protocol by i n tercepting messages, supplying false messages to the participants, and performing operations on messages himself in order to nd out a secret word, may be thought of as attempting to determine whether a particular word belongs to a given term-rewriting language.
In Dolev and Yao, the security of a protocol is expressed in terms of a penetrator's being unable to generate words belonging to some predetermined set. Thus, for example, a protocol may be considered secure if a penetrator is unable to discover secret data not intended for him. In our model this notion of security is extended to cover the penetrator's inability to cause internal state variables to take on certain values. Thus we might s a y that a protocol is insecure if a penetrator is able both to learn a word K and convince an honest participant that K is a session key good for communication with some other honest participant.
In De nitions of terms and related ideas are given below. The concepts are standard, but the particular de nitions used are from 34 .
De nition 3.2: Let be a countable set of variables and F a family of function symbols disjoint from with associated arity. A term is either a variable or a function symbol followed by n terms, where n is the arity of the function symbol. A function symbol of arity zero is called a constant. Let T,F denote the set of all terms made up from and F . A substitution is a function from to T,F that is the identity on all but a nite subset of . The term obtained by applying a substitution to the variables of a term F is denoted by T. A uni er of two terms F and G is a substitution such that F = G. A most general uni er of F and G is a uni er of F and G, such that, if is another uni er, there is another uni er such that = . Most general uni ers are unique up to renaming of variables.
Since our analyzer is written in Prolog, we will follow its conventions and represent function symbols by lower-case words and variables from by capital letters or words beginning with capital letters. Variables not from , such as, for example, the variable I used to represent the words input into a rule, will be represented by italicized capital letters or italicized words beginning with capital letters.
De nition 3.3: A term-rewriting system over T,F is a set of directed equationsÊ such that, for T 1 ! T 2 inÊ, V T 2 VT 1 , where VT denotes the set of variables appearing in T. !Ê is the nest relation over T,F containingÊ and closed by substitution of terms for variables and replacement o f subterms by their reduced forms. If A is a term, and there is a unique irreducible term that can be obtained by applying reductions to A, w e call that term nfA, or the normal form of A. A substitution T,F is said to be a uni er of U and T with respect toÊ if U and T are reducible to the same term using repeated applications of the rewrite rules in !Ê. A set of uni ers of A and Bwith respect toÊ is complete if, for any unifer of A and B with respect toÊ, there is a substitution and a 2 such that = .
We will be interested in term-rewriting systems that are Noetherian and locally con uent. These are de ned below.
De nition 3.4: LetÊ be a term-rewriting system over T,F . We s a y thatÊ is Noetherian if, whenever term A is reachable from term B via a sequence of applications of reduction rules, then term A is reachable from term B via a nite sequence of such applications. We s a y thatÊ is locally con uent if whenever A is reducible to B and to C by t w o di erent single reductions, then B and C are both reducible to a fourth term D.
Noetherian, locally con uent systems have the property that every term A is reducible to a unique irreducible normal form nfA. See Huet and Oppen 11 for a discussion.
We n o w de ne what we mean by a system state, and show h o w w e describe states.
De nition 3.5: A system state is a pair , where gives the set of words known by the penetrator a n d Thus, for example, given the state description fek,Xg,fg, we assume that the penetrator knows a w ord ek, X, where is a substitution assigning X to a term such that ek, X remains irreducible. Hence the penetrator might know ek,m or ek,er,s, but not ek,dk,m, which reduces to m.
The assumption of irreducibility is necessary in order for the de nition of state description to be meaningful. For example, suppose that we did not enforce this restriction, and we assumed that the penetrator knew some word of the form ek,X. Then, since X could equal dk,Y, and ek,dk,Y reduces to Y, all this would mean would be that the penetrator knows some word Y. This is not very useful information.
A rule may n o w b e i n terpreted as a means of moving from state description to state description as follows. The conditions of a rule set out a state description that must be satis ed for a rule to apply, and the conclusions give the rules for constructing the new state description that holds after the rule has red. This notion is set out formally below. Then we s a y that the state description L, D i s r e achable from the state description L 0 , D 0 via the rule R. W e s a y that P 0 is reachable from P via the rules R 1 , ..., R k if there is a sequence of state descriptions P 0 , ...., P k , such that P 0 is reachable from P k via R k , and so on. Note that, in our description of how w e use a rule to move from one state description to another, we required that the input be interpreted as irreducible words, but not necessarily the output. This is because, as we noted before, we think of the input of the rule as giving a state description that must hold for the rule to re, and of the output of the rule as giving the method for producing a new state description, but not the state description itself.
As an example of moving from one state description to another via a rule, suppose the penetrator knows the word message" and KEYSTATEa = key1. If we let be the substitution Y := message, Z := a, and X := key1, then we can apply the rule If Y W and KEYSTATEZ = X then W := W eX,Y so that the new state becomes one in which the penetrator knows the words fmessage, ekey1,messageg and KEYSTATE a = k ey1. Thus we m o v ed from the state description fmessageg,fKEYSTATEa = key1g to the state description fmessage,ekey1,messageg,fKEYSTATEa = key1g via application of the rule.
Thus we see how w e can progress from state to state in following the progress of a protocol. But, in proving that a protocol is secure, we w ant t o s h o w, not how w e can proceed from state to state, but that certain states cannot be reached from any initial state. In order to do this, we need to be able to determine, given a state description, what states can immediately precede a state satisfying that description. We do this by unifying a state description with the reduced form of the conclusion of a rule. But the techniques we apply are somewhat di erent than the techniques we apply in order to nd what states can immediately follow a state. Suppose as before that we are given a state description L,D. We now look for a substitution such that A 0 reduces to a statement that does not contradict D and either some subset of O reduces to a subset of L or some subset of A 0 reduces to a subset of D. We then examine O and A and check that to get the previous state to be one in which the penetrator knows Y and KEYSTATEZ = X. On the other hand, if we apply the same rule but let be the substitution Y := dX,Q, then eX,Y := eX,dX,Q reduces to Q and the previous state is one in which the penetrator knows dX,Q and KEYSTATEZ = X.
As we see from above, there is often more than one unifying a system state description with the conclusion of a rule. Since we w ant to be able to describe all possible system states that can immediately precede a state satisfying a given description, we w ant to be able, for each rule, to nd all matching up the state description with the conclusion of that rule. There are usually an in nite number of such , but it is often possible to nd a nite and complete set of such , that is a set such that, if tau is a substitution matching up the state with a conclusion of a rule, then there is a 2 such that tau = sigma for some substitution . However, we will not use any members of that make a n y terms in the target state reducible.
We can nd such complete sets by using algorithms developed for nding complete sets of uni ers with respect to some equational theory 11 . The term-rewriting system we use is Noetherian and locally con uent and thus we w ere able to make use of one of a class of algorithms, called narrowing algorithms, rst discussed by Slagle 29 , that can be used to generate complete sets of uni ers with respect to such term-rewriting systems. Accordingly, w e h a v e written a program in Prolog 6 , that uses a modi ed version of the NARROWER algorithm of Rety et al. 27 to generate from a protocol speci cation and a description of a system state P a complete description of all system states that can immediately precede a state that satis es P.
In order to see how the program works, suppose that we w e are given a speci cation consisting of the single rule In order to apply our program, we w ant to be able to use it to show that some insecure state S de ned in terms of words known by the penetrator and values of state variables is not reachable from an initial state. In order to do this, we will want to be able to show that, as we w ork backwards from S, we e n ter an in nite loop of states, none of which are the initial state. But it is not usually the case that we k eep entering the same set of states over and over again. Instead, what often happens is something like the following. Suppose that we w ant to know whether or not the penetrator can obtain a word a. We put the question to the analyzer, and we nd that it is necessary and su cient t o h a v e obtained either the word eX,a and X, or dX,a and X, where X can be any w ord. When we ask the analyzer how the penetrator can obtain eX,a or dX,a, we nd that, in the rst case, knowledge of eY,eX,a or dY,eX,a is needed, and in the second case, that knowledge of eY,eX,a or dY,eX,a is needed. These results suggest that we attempt to prove the unobtainability of the irreducible members of the formal language
where L is the language consisting of all words of T,F , by showing that knowledge of any irreducible word of K requires previous knowledge of some other irreducible word of K. W e do this by running the analyzer on each production K. W e h a v e already run it on the rst, and obtained the result for that production. We next run it on eA,B and dA,B, where B is assumed to be an irreducible memberof K, and analyze the results. For example, suppose that we run the analyzer on eA,B, with the assumption that B is an irreducible member of K, and it tells us that prior knowledge of either A and B, eZ,eA,B for some Z, or dZ,eA,B for some Z, is required. Since B, eZ,eA,B, and dZ,eA,B all belong to K, and since by the assumption under which the analyzer operates, they are all irreducible, this means that knowledge of an irreducible member of the second production of K requires previous knowledge of an irreducible member of K.
Once we h a v e proved that any state that includes knowledge of a particular word or a member of a family of words is unreachable, we can use that result to prove that other states are unreachable by showing that, in order to reach these states, the penetrator needed to know one of the unreachable words. This is the way in which our analysis usually proceeded.
Modeling the Selective Broadcast Protocol
In this section we describe how the selective broadcast protocol was formally modeled, and give the speci cation of the protocol.
We will assume that the system consists of an unspeci ed number of users, where each user is represented by a processor T capable of generating an in nite number of messages messT,N to be encrypted, where N ranges from 1 to in nity. Since we do not care about the content of the messages, no loss of generality results from assuming that the messages are generated by the processor rather than the user. We will assume that messages are generated in numerical order. We only pay attention to the rst K bits of each message where K is the block length of the cryptosystem involved; thus we can assume that each message is a K bit block. We will assume that the penetrator has gained control of an unspeci ed number of processors. We identify each processor under control of the penetrator by qID,dishonest, where ID is a processor identi er, one of id 1 is Noetherian and locally con uent. Proof: It is clear that the system is Noetherian, since every reduction transforms a string into a shorter string. Thus every sequence of reductions is terminating. In order to prove local con uence, we make use of the Knuth-Bendix theorem 14 , which uses the set of critical pairs, which are de ned as follows:
1. Rename variables so that no two reduction rules have a n y v ariables in common. Now that we h a v e shown that our term-rewriting system is Noetherian and locally con uent, we are ready to give our speci cation of the protocol. We rst model the behavior of the honest processors and their owners, who we assume behave according to the rules of the protocol. Each honest processor can generate and encrypt messages. Each message is identi ed by a name denoted by nameqX,Y,N where qX,Y is the identi er of the processor originating the message, and the message is the N'th message generated by that processor. The message itself as opposed to its name is denoted by messqX,Y,N. The distinction between message and name is that the name can be made public, while the message remains secret. Thus the rule for generation and encryption of messages is given as: Each honest processor can also encrypt a key for a message and send it to another processor P. W e will assume that an encrypted key for message nameqID,honest,N is sent only after a request for that message has been received from P. A processor or its owner may decide not to honor a request; however, we do not specify the decision process. Thus this rule may be thought of as a nondeterministic one. We will also assume that is is possible that a processor may forwa r d a k ey without determining whether or not the identi er given is an identi er for an existing processor and not some other K-bit word. If fX,Yg W then W := W f ek,qID,honest, ek,edk,X,dqID,honest,edk,X,dqID,honest,dk,Yg
Finally, a processor can attempt to decrypt a message. In our speci cation of this rule, we divided it up into four parts. Since the encrypted message is generated separately from the encrypted key, w e found it simpler to specify the parts in which the key and message are loaded in two separate rules. We then included a rule in which the checking of key and message is performed, and a rule which describes the processor's behavior after the check is performed. Thus the four steps are as follows.
1. A processor receives a message name and the identi er of the sender of the message. 2. The processor receives and decrypts a key. 3. The processor checks the key against the identi ers.
If the check in
Step 3 succeeds, the processor receives the message and decrypts it. The separation between Steps 3 and 4 was necessary, since Step 4 involves a comparison with the reduced form of a word produced in Step 3. As our system stands now, such comparisons cannot be done within a single rule, but must be divided across two or more rules: one which generates the word, and one which does the comparison. The separation between Steps 1, 2, and 3, however, was largely a matter of convenience and was motivated by the desire to avoid having to specify a step in which the originator of an encrypted message concatenates encrypted message, encrypted key, and message identifer into a single message. Note that all we h a v e done is break a process that was originally described in a single rule into four components. Thus there is no loss of realism.
We begin by specifying the rst rule. First, a processor accepts a message name and the identi er of the message originator. In doing so, it checks that IDSTATE does not hold any old name-identi er pairs, that is, that IDSTATE = zero, and that KEYSTATE Once key and identi er are loaded, the processor checks to see if they agree.
If IDSTATEqID,honest = X,Y and KEYSTATEqID,honest = Z and READYSTATEqID,honest = zero and RUNSTATEqID,honest = zero then READYSTATE := id checkX, ek,eY,Z The processor now decrypts the encrypted message. In doing so, it rst checks that no message is presently stored in RUNSTATE.
If X W and KEYSTATEqID,honest = Y and READYSTATEqID,honest = yes and RUNSTATEqID,honest = zero then RUNSTATEqID,honest := dY,X The processor can also zero out all variables at any time. In an actual application, this would either be at the direction of the user, or possibly in response to an error, or both. Note that, since we do not specify the conditions under which the zeroing out may occur, the if" portion of this rule is empty. The rule for encrypting a key is identical to the rule for encrypting a message, except that the last output is not given. Since the penetrator learns no more from that rule than from the rule for encrypting a message, we will omit it.
Secondly, the penetrator can use a terminal in order to attempt to decrypt a message. These rules are identical to the rules for the honest processors, except that, in the rule describing READYSTATE, the penetrator can learn the terminal output. The READYSTATE rule is given below: There are at least three goals that a penetrator may try to attain. One of these, of course, is to decrypt a message from an honest processor on one of the processors under his control that is not authorized to decrypt that message. Note that this includes the case in which another processor under his control may b e authorized to decrypt the message. The second is to convince a processor to decrypt a message supplied by the penetrator under the illusion that it is decrypting a message supplied by an honest processor. Finally, if the protocol is used in a situation in which users are not allowed to see messages in the clear even if they are allowed to decrypt them inside their processor, the penetrator may try to obtain a copy of an honest processors's message in the clear.
The penetrator will have attained his rst goal if he is able make some state variable RUNSTATEqID1,dishonest take the value messqID2,honest,K without processor qID1,dishonest having requested the right to that message. He will have attained his second goal if he is able to make one of the state variables RUNSTATEqID2,honest = messqID1,dishonest,N and IDSTATE = Q,qID3,honest . He will have attained his third goal if some messqID1,honest,N 2 W.
We will assume that initially the penetrator knows all processor identi ers ek,qA,B, as well as a set of messages messqID,dishonest,B belonging to the dishonest processors, along with their names, and the value zero.
Analysis of the Selective Broadcast Protocol
In our analysis of the selective broadcast protocol, we asked three questions:
1. Can a penetrator obtain a cleartext copy of a program belonging to an honest user of the system? 2. Can a module under the control of the penetrator gain access to a program belonging to an honest user which has not been legitimately been granted by that user? 3. Can a penetrator pass o his own program as a program originated by an honest user?
The answers to the rst two questions turned out to be negative. Details of that analysis are provided in 18 .
As we mentioned earlier, the answer to the third question was positive. But, in order to be able to present our analysis, we need to make use of several lemmas we proved about the unobtainability of certain kinds of words. We omit the proofs since they are lengthy and similar to other proofs that are provided in this paper. Details of the proofs are provided in 18 .
Lemma 5.1: It is impossible for a penetrator to obtain an irreducible word of the form dX,Y unless X and Y are already known.
Thus, if we ask the analyzer how a penetrator could nd some word Y, we can ask it to ignore all output that requires previous knowledge of dX,Y, since this would require that Y already be known. A w ord is odd if it satis es the rst two criteria and no instance of it satis es the third. We n o w wish to attempt to show that a penetrator cannot pass o his own message as somebody else's. Recall that a message messqID,dishonest,N has been successfully substituted for a message messqID2,honest,Q if there is a processor qB,honest with IDSTATEqB,honest = nameqID2,honest,Q,qID2,honest RUNSTATEqB,honest = messqID,dishonest,N Accordingly we run the analyzer on these two state values and nd that the following set of conditions must hold immediately prior to attaining these values: knowledge of eX,messqID,dishonest,N IDSTATEqB,honest = nameqID2,honest,Q,qID2,honest KEYSTATEqB,honest = X READYSTATEqB,honest = yes RUNSTATEqB,honest = zero Running the analyzer on the four state values given above, we nd that the following must have held previously:
IDSTATEqB,honest = nameqID2,honest,Q,qID2,honest KEYSTATEqB,honest = X = dY,dk,nameqID2,honest,Q READYSTATEqB,honest = zero RUNSTATEqB,honest = zero Thus the penetrator can substitute messqID,dishonest,N for messqID2,honest,Q if and only if he can obtain edqID2,honest,dk,nameqID2,honest,Q,messqID,dishonest,N and cause the state variables of processor qB,honest to take on the values given above.
Running the analyzer on the state values listed above, we nd that one of the following is required to hold previously: a IDSTATEqB,honest = nameqID2,honest,Q,qB,honest KEYSTATEqB,honest = zero READYSTATEqB,honest = zero RUNSTATEqB,honest = zero with knowledge of nameqID2,honest,Q b IDSTATEqB,honest = nameqB,honest,Q,qID2,honest KEYSTATEqB,honest = zero READYSTATEqB,honest = zero RUNSTATEqB,honest = zero with knowledge of ek,eqB,honest, dqID2,honest,eqB,honest,dqID2,honest,dk,nameqID2,honest,Q The word nameqID2,honest,Q is obtainable when processor qID2,honest transmists the word nameqID2,honest,Q, while the word ek,eqB,honest,dqID2,honest,eqB,honest,dqID2,honest,dk,nameqID2,honest,Q is obtainable by h a ving processor qB,honest purchase the rights to messqID2,honest,Q.
Running the analyzer on the state values given in a and b, we are told that they may be obtained if previously all state values are zero and nameqID2,honest,Q is previously known, and, in case a, if ek,qB,honest is previously known, and, in case b, if ek,qID2,honest is known. Since all ek,qS,T are assumed to be known, and since all state values can be made zero at any time by applying the rule that sets all the values to zero, and since nameqID2,honest,Q is obtainable, this set of state values is obtainable. Thus, working our way back up, we h a v e shown that the set of state values IDSTATEqB,honest = nameqID2,Q,qID2,honest RUNSTATEqB,honest = messqID,dishonest,N is obtainable if and only if the word Z = edqID2,honest,dk,nameqID2,honest,Q,messqID,dishonest,N is obtainable.
Thus our next task is to show that Z is unobtainable, and we set out to do this. However, after running the analyzer on Z we nd that this it is obtainable by the penetrator. The scenario is as follows. Processor qID,dishonest obtains an encrypted key to messqID2,honest,Q from processor qID2,honest. Processor qID,dishonest applies the rule for encrypting messages:
If fA,B,Mg W then W := W f ek,qID,dishonest, ek,edk,B,dqID,dishonest,edk,B,dqID,dishonest,dk,A, edqID,dishonest,edk,B,edqID,dishonest,dk,A,Mg with input A = ek,eqID,dishonest, dqID2,honest,eqID,dishonest,dqID2,honest,dk,nameqID2,honest,Q B = ek,qID2,honest M = messqID,dishonest,N where A is the encrypted key to messqID,honest,Q. The word output is Z = edqID2,honest,dk,nameqID2,honest,Q,messqID,dishonest,N.
This gives us the penetration scenario described in Section 2. Fortunately, the aw uncovered is easy to correct. If the rule for encrypting messages had been applied correctly, the second word input would have been ek,qID,dishonest. Moreover, both k and qID,dishonest are stored in processor qID,dishonest. Thus, we can alter the message encryption rule such that the processor either checks that the second word input is the correct one, or supplies the word itself without requiring any input. Thus we can replace the penetrator's program encryption rule with If fP M g W then W := W f ek,qID,dishonest,P,edqID,dishonest,dk,P,Mg However, recall that the original message encryption rule subsumed the key encryption rule as well. This is no longer the case, and so we m ust supply the key encryption rule separately: If fA,Bg W then W := W f ek,qID,dishonest, ek,edk,B,dqID,dishonest,edk,B,dqID,dishonest,dk,Ag.
We n o w wish to prove that the new protocol satis es the desired security property. H o w ever, we d o not wish to reverify the properties the old protocol already satis es if we can avoid it. Thus we i n troduce the notion of restrictions of rules and protocols. De nition 5.8: A protocol speci cation S 0 is a restriction of a protocol speci cation S if S 0 is obtained by replacing every rule in S either by itself or by a n umber of restrictions of that rule. Lemma 5.9: Let S be a protocol speci cation, and let S' be a restriction of S. Let P be a description of a state in terms of words known by a penetrator and values of state variables. If all states described by P are unreachable in S, then all such states are unreachable in S'. Moreover, if the states described by P are unreachable in S except via some state described by a description P', then the same is true for S'.
Proof: Let P be such a description, and suppose that there is a state Q described by P that is reachable in S' but not in S. T h us there is a sequence Q 0 ! R 0 ! Q 1 ! .... R k,1 ! Q k ! R k ! Q where Q 0 is an initial state, and Q i ! R i ! Q i+1 means that Q i+1 is reached from Q i by means of R i . Since each R i is either equal to a rule R 0 i in S or a restriction of such a rule, there exists a substitution on the variables of R 0 i acting as the identity on the variables of R i such that R 0 i di ers from R i only in that possibly more words are required for input, fewer words are output, and stronger conditions are required on the input words and states. Thus, if Q i+1 is reachable from Q i via R 0 i , it is reachable via R i , and hence, by the de nition of reachability, via R i . T h us Q is reachable in S 0 .
A similar argument w orks for the second assertion of this lemma. 2 The two new rules that we de ned satisfy all the requirements of a restriction of the original rule except that the input words of the original rule do not form a subset of the input words of the new rules. We can get around this noting that this property is satis ed if we require that ek,qID,dishonest is required to be an input word in the program encryption rule. Since this word is assumed to be known initially by the penetrator, its inclusion or omission has no e ect on the reachability or nonreachability of a state. Thus we do not need to reprove a n y of the lemmas that we proved earlier. Nor do we need to reprove the fact that a penetrator can pass o his own message as somebody else's only if he is able to produce the word edqID2,honest,dk,nameqID2,honest,Q,messqID,dishonest,N We n o w w ant to use our revised speci cation to prove the theorem:
Theorem 5.10: The word edqID2,honest,dk,nameqID2,honest,Q,messqID,dishonest,N is unobtainable. Proof: W e n o w run the analyzer using the revised speci cation, on the word edqID2,honest,dk,nameqID2,honest,Q,messqID,dishonest,N, asking it to ignore cases that require prior knowledge of dZ,edqID2,honest,dk,nameqID2,honest,Q,messqID,dishonest,N or dqID2,honest,dk,nameqID2,honest,Q, and, after discarding cases which require prior knowledge of an odd word, we nd that one of the following three conditions must be satis ed:
a prior knowledge of eX,edqID2,honest,dk,nameqID2,honest,Q,messqID,dishonest,N and X; b prior knowledge of ek,eB,dC,eB,dC,dk,edqID2,honest,dk,nameqID2,honest,Q, messqID,dishonest,N, or; c KEYSTATEqE,dishonest = dX,dk,edqID2,honest,dk,nameqID2,honest,Q,messqID,dishonest,N and IDSTATEqE,dishonest = Y,X .
In the case of c, we run the analyzer on KEYSTATEqE,F = eX,dk,edqID2,honest,dk,nameqID2,honest,Q,messqID,dishonest,N and IDSTATEqE,F = Y,X , and nd that prior knowledge of one of c1 ek,eB,dC,eB,dC,dk, edqA,honest,dk,nameqID2,honest,Q,messqID,dishonest,N, or; c2 edqID2,honest,dk,nameqID2,honest,Q,messqID,dishonest,N is required. This leads us to attempt to verify the unobtainability of all irreducible words from the language C de ned by C ! edqID2,honest,dk,nameqID2,honest,Q,messqID,dishonest,N C ! eL,C C ! dL,C Lemma 5.11: No irreducible word of C is obtainable. Proof: W e prove that C is unobtainable by showing that knowledge of a word from C implies previous knowledge of either a word already shown to be unobtainable or another word from C. W e do this by using the technique outlined in Section 2, and running the analyzer on each of the productions of C. H o w ever, by Lemma 5.1, knowledge of dX,Y implies previous knowledge of Y, so we already know that knowledge of a word from the third production implies previous knowledge of a word from C. T h us we only need to run the analyzer on the rst two productions. We rst run it on X = edqID2,honest,dk,nameqID2,honest,Q,messqID,dishonest,N asking it to ignore all solutions that require previous knowledge of X, eZ,X, or dZ,X for some Z, since all these words are known to be members of C. The analyzer produces a number of solutions. All of them require previous knowledge of a word of C, except for two, one of which requires previous knowledge of ek,eqID3,dishonest,dqID2,honest,dk,nameqID2,honest,N.
and one of which requires previous knowledge of messqID,dishonest,N and dqID2,honest,dk,nameqID2,honest,N.
The last of these is unobtainable by Corollary 5. a X = k, Y = eA,dB,eA,dB,dk,C, and prior knowledge of C is required; b X = k, Y = ek,eA,dB,eA,dB,C, and prior knowledge of ek,C is required; c X = k, Y = eA,dB,eA,C, and prior knowledge of ek,eB,C and ek,B is required; d X = k, Y = eA,dB,C, and prior knowledge of ek,eB,dA,C is required; e X = k, Y = eA,C, and prior knowledge of ek,B and ek,eB,dA,eB,C is required; f X = k, Y = C, and prior knowledge of ek,eB,dA,eB,dA,C is required; g X = D, Y = C, and prior knowledge of ek,eB,dA,eB,dA,dk,eD,C is required; h X = k, Y = dqR,dishonest,eA,C, and prior knowledge of ek,eqR,dishonest,C is required.
We begin by giving the proof for case a in detail. Since we assumed Y 2 C, a n d Y = eA,dB,eA,dB,dk,C, this means that either dB,eA,dB,dk,C 2 C or A = dqID2,honest,dk,nameqID2,honest,Q and dB,eA,dB,dk,C reduces to the word messqID,dishonest,N. But the latter is impossible, since Y, and hence dB,eA,dB,dk,C, is assumed to be irreducible. Thus, dB,eA,dB,dk,C 2 C. F rom this fact, by the de nition of C and the irreducibility of the word dB,eA,dB,dk,C, we h a v e eA,dB,dk,C 2 C. Using this fact and reasoning similar to the case for the word dB,eA,dB,dk,C, we get that dB,dk,C 2 C. F rom the de nition of C, w e get that dk,C 2 C, and using the de nition of C again, we get that C 2 C. Since prior knowledge of C is required in case a, this means that prior knowledge of a word from C is required.
Similar reasoning can be used to prove the result for all cases except c, e, and h; we show that the word must belong to the second or third production of C, and work our way d o wn.
In cases c, e and h this reasoning fails if A = dqID2,honest,dk,nameqID2,honest,N and C = messqID,dishonest,N. In cases c and e, if these values for A and C hold, prior knowledge of ek,A = ek,dqID2,honest,dk,nameqID2,honest,N is required. In case h, if these values for A and C hold, prior knowledge of ek,qR,dishonest,C = ek,qR,dishonest,messqID,dishonest,N is required. Thus, all we h a v e t o s h o w is that ek,dqID2,honest,dk,nameqID2,honest,N, ek,eqID3,dishonest,dqID2,honest,dk,nameqID2,honest,N, and ek,qR,dishonest,messqID,dishonest,N are unobtainable. But these are all odd words, which are unobtainable by Lemma 5.6. Thus we h a v e shown that knowledge of a member of the language C requires prior knowledge of an unobtainable word or of another member of C, and so we are done. 2 
Discussion
The fact that our techniques could be used to nd security a ws in a previously published protocol shows that it is likely that they can be re ned and developed into useful tools for protocol analysis. Our experience in specifying and analyzing this protocol also points out ways in which they can be improved.
To begin with, in our speci cation we modeled a protocol in which all systems operated correctly. Thus we w ere able to show that no security violations occurred in a system in which no errors occurred. However, the goal of most protocols is, not only to ensure security i f e v erything operates correctly, but to minimize the e ects of system errors and security violations. If it fails to do so, it is considered to be inadequate. For example, the aw in the Needham-Schroeder protocol 23 discovered by Denning and Sacco 7 required the existence of a previously compromised session key to be exploited.
Similar issues arose in our analysis of the Simmons protocol in 18 . For example, we discovered that it was possible for a penetrator to gain illegal access to messages if the cryptographic modules failed in a certain way. Although in 18 w e listed this as a aw in the protocol, it can not really be considered one since the Simmons protocol explicitly depends upon the correct operations of the cryptographic modules. However, it is still of interest because the type of failure required was not one that would appear at rst glance to be likely to cause a security breach. Hence, knowledge of the e ects of this failure might b e useful to someone who is trying to nd out what assumptions about the cryptographic modules we can a ord to weaken.
Thus, there are two t ypes of failures that it would be useful to be able to handle. One of these is the class of failures that we consider likely to occur, such as the compromise of a used session key. W e can include such failures by specifying them as part of the protocol; this, for example, is what we did in 19 i n an analysis of a variant of the Needham-Schroeder protocol. The other is the class of failures that may o r may not be likely, but can be shown to cause security failures in the protocol. It is, of course, impossible to list all such failures, but it would be useful to have a system that could assist in their discovery.
Another related question that arose in our analysis was the question of what penetrator actions we should consider relevant to the security of the protocol. Clearly, the ability of the penetrator to insert information into his own processors, to communicate with the other protocol participants, and to encrypt and decrypt on his own, were relevant to the security of the protocol and were included in the speci cation, but we did not include the penetrator's ability to apply the successor and predecessor operators. However, we had no formal basis for making these decisions. Likewise, if we had also attempted to specify the incorrect operation of the protocol, we w ould have had no good means of choosing which errors to consider as important.
One means of deciding what penetrator actions to include would be to examine previous, similar protocols and see what actions penetrators used to exploit aws in these. This was the reasoning behind our decision to include the actions we did; we l o o k ed at the earlier protocol described in 25 and included the actions that a penetrator would have used to exploit its security a w. But it would be helpful if we had a more formal basis for excluding certain penetrator actions in the analysis of the protocol. In particular, we w ould like to be able to prove general results that give classes of protocols such that, if a protocol belongs to a certain class and is vulnerable to an attack i n v olving a certain penetrator action, then it is vulnerable to an attack not involving that action. This is the kind of result proved by E v en, Goldreich, and Shamir in 9 . They de ne a class of public-key protocols and show that, if a protocol belonging to this class is vulnerable to an attack i n v olving certain algebraic properties of the RSA, then it is vulnerable to an attack not involving these properties. The result of Even et al. was obtained for a relatively narrowly de ned class of protocols, and it is unlikely that we w ould be able to prove similar theorems for more broadly de ned classes. However, we might be able to develop techniques for proving theorems about protocols that will allow us to show that a particular penetrator action is irrelevant t o the security of a given protocol.
Another question that arises is: how d o w e c haracterize the insecure states of a protocol? The techniques that we h a v e outlined in this paper give us no assistance in answering this question. Our techniques allow us to specify the operation of a protocol, but they do not help us to determine its requirements. Extensions to the our system that we h a v e subsequently developed make c haracterization of security and insecurity a little easier; in 19 w e i n troduce a model in which w e can specify the security of a protocol not only in terms of words learned by a penetrator and values of internal state variables, but in terms of histories of events that should or should not occur. Since most cryptographic protocols are informally speci ed in terms of such histories, this allows a more natural way of mapping the designer's intuitive notion of what characterizes the desirable behavior of a protocol to our more formal model. However, it still does not give a formal methodology for characterizing the security of a protocol. In order to do so, we should turn to other methods. One such is the use of logics of belief or trust to analyze cryptographic protocols, such as the work of Burrows, Abadi, and Needham 4 , or that of Rangan 26 , both discussed in Section 2. In these systems, a protocol is mapped to a set of assertions in modal logic. The goal of the protocol is mapped to another such assertion. The set of assertions is then analyzed using formally de ned inference rules to determine whether or not the asserted goal of the protocol is derivable. If they are not, the assertions that the protocol should but fails to provide are generated. Thus the security o f a protocol is examined at a much higher level of abstraction then our method of analysis provides.
The weakness of this approach is that the mapping of the protocol to the assertions and the construction of the inference rules is relatively informal. Moreover, since the level of abstraction is high, many features of the protocol are necessarily not captured. Thus, although the use of these techniques in the analysis of the selective broadcast protocol would probably have uncovered the need for the assertion that a participant in the protocol can only encrypt messages with his own key, i t w ould have been unlikely to provide any assistance in determining whether or not the protocol satis ed this assertion. Our analysis showed that the protocol did not. Thus, it seems that what might be useful is some sort of layered approach, applying modal logic techniques to determine the requirements of a protocol, and then using techniques similar to those described in this paper to determine whether or not a protocol can meet those requirements. This is in line with current practice in system veri cation. There is no one veri cation technique that is appropriate for all layers of abstraction. Instead, one uses di erent techniques to perform speci cation and veri cation at di erent level of abstractions. The results of the veri cation at a given level provide assertions to be proved at the next lower level of abstraction.
One more question remains to be answered. That is: how w ell will these techniques scale up? Our techniques worked well on a relatively simple protocol that could be speci ed using a small number of protocol rules and a small number of rewrite rules. How can we make them work well on more complex protocols? This question can be answered in part by improving the mechanisms we use in the protocol analysis: by improving the e ciency of the narrowing algorithm we use, by extending the program so that it generates complete sets of equational uni ers for broader classes of equational theories, and by extending the functionality of the program. For example, it would be useful if our program included mechanisms for determining whether or not a word belonged to a formal language input by the protocol analyzer. This would have eliminated a lot of the hand analysis we had to do. But we will also need to develop techniques for showing that the composition of already veri ed pieces of a system satis es its security requirements, and techniques for limiting the reveri cation that needs to be done when a system is modi ed.
Conclusion
In this paper we h a v e presented a formal model for a class of cryptographic protocols, a procedure for proving security properties of protocols speci ed according to this model, and a program that provides automated assistance in these proofs. We speci ed a published protocol and attempted to prove it secure using our techniques. The fact that these techniques exposed a aw in the protocol provides evidence that these techniques can provide signi cant assistance in the analysis of protocols.
